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China  successfully  achieved  universal  health  insurance  coverage  in  2011,  representing  the
largest expansion  of  insurance  coverage  in  human  history.  While  the  achievement  is widely
recognized,  it  is still  largely  unexplored  why  China  was  able  to  attain it within  a short  period.
This study  aims  to  ﬁll  the  gap.  Through  a systematic  political  and  socio-economic  analy-
sis, it  identiﬁes  seven  major  drivers  for  China’s  success,  including  (1)  the  SARS  outbreak
as  a  wake-up  call,  (2)  strong  public  support  for government  intervention  in  health  care,
(3) renewed  political  commitment  from  top leaders,  (4)  heavy  government  subsidies,  (5)
ﬁscal capacity  backed  by China’s  economic  power,  (6)  ﬁnancial  and  political  responsibili-
ties  delegated  to local  governments  and  (7)  programmatic  implementation  strategy.  Three
of the  factors  seem  to  be unique  to  China  (i.e.,  the  SARS  outbreak,  the  delegation,  and the
programmatic  strategy.)  while  the  other factors  are  commonly  found  in other  countries’
insurance  expansion  experiences.  This  study  also  discusses  challenges  and  recommenda-
tions  for China’s  health  ﬁnancing,  such  as reducing  ﬁnancial  risk  as  an  immediate  task,
equalizing  beneﬁt  across  insurance  programs  as  a long-term  goal,  improving  quality  by
tying provider  payment  to performance,  and  controlling  costs  through  coordinated  reform
initiatives.  Finally,  it draws  lessons  for  other  developing  countries.
© 2015  The  Author.  Published  by Elsevier  Ireland  Ltd.  This  is an  open  access  article  under
Y-NC-Nthe  CC  B
. Introduction
Universal health insurance coverage is rarely found in
eveloping countries. That is why international experts
re greatly impressed by the universal coverage recently
chieved by China, the world’s largest developing coun-
ry with 1.3 billion population. For example, a World Bank
eport praised China’s achievement as “unparalleled,” [1]
epresenting the largest expansion of insurance coverage
 Open Access for this article is made possible by a collaboration
etween Health Policy and The European Observatory on Health Systems
nd Policies.
∗ Correspondence to: RAND Corporation, 4570 Fifth Avenue, Pittsburgh,
A  15213, USA. Tel.: +412 683 2300 4460; fax: +412 683 2800.
E-mail address: hao yu@rand.org
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2015.07.008
168-8510/© 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd. Th
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).D  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
in human history. One study concluded that China’s expe-
rience is “exemplary for other nations that pursue universal
health coverage” [2]. The achievement also drew attention
of the mass media [3]. While China’s success in coverage
expansion is widely recognized, few studies have systemat-
ically examined reasons for the success. This study aims to
ﬁll the gap. The study ﬁndings will help answer three ques-
tions that are of interest to policymakers and researchers
both within and without China:
1. What are the major drivers for China’s achievement of
universal health insurance coverage?
2. What are the policy challenges for sustaining the
achievement in the next decade?
3. What lessons can be learned from China’s experience?
is is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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To analyze these questions, this study drew data from
public sources. It searched the PubMed (http://www.ncbi.
nlm.nih.gov/pubmed) for journal articles published in
English language, the China Knowledge Resource Inte-
grated Database (http://www.cnki.net/) for journal articles
published in Chinese language, and the Internet for mass
media reports and government documents. Using the data,
this paper ﬁrst brieﬂy summarizes China’s achievement.
Then it analyzes major drivers for the achievement before
discussing policy challenges and recommendations. Finally
it summarizes the lessons from China’s experience.
2. China’s achievement of universal health
insurance coverage
China’s achievement is impressive for both the scale
of coverage expansion, which is the largest expansion in
human history, and the speed of expansion—by 2011, 95%
of Chinese population was insured, compared with less
than 50% in 2005 (for a brief summary of the evolution
of China’s health care ﬁnancing systems, see Table 1) [1].
The coverage is offered through three public insurance
programs. Table 2 summarizes key features of the three
programs.
1. New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme (NRCMS),
launched in 2003 in rural areas. Its enrollment rose to
97% of rural population in 2011 [4].
2. Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance (URBMI),
launched in 2007 to target the unemployed, children,
students, and the disabled in urban areas. It covered 93%
of the target population in 2010 [2].
3. Urban Employee Basic Medical Insurance (UEBMI),
launched in 1998 as an employment-based insurance
program. Its coverage reached 92% in 2010 [2].
3. Signiﬁcant factors for China’s universal health
insurance coverage
3.1. SARS outbreak as a wake-up call
To a large extent, China’s recent coverage expansion
represents a long-overdue government investment in the
country’s health care system. While the past three decades
have witnessed China’s economic take-off, the country’s
health care system has not kept pace with the eco-
nomic development [5,6]. As government ofﬁcials became
increasingly occupied by economic development, govern-
ment health expenditures dropped from 37% of total health
expenditures in 1980 to 18% in 2004 [7]. The economic
reform also unexpectedly led to serious deterioration in
insurance coverage [8,9], with insurance rate falling to 5%
and 38% in rural and urban areas respectively in 1998 [4,10].
Many researchers were alarmed by the falling coverage,
and some researchers started experimental studies in the
1990s in an effort to rebuild the health insurance system,
especially in rural China [11–13]. While the studies pro-
duced a wealth of experience that was eventually drawn on
by Chinese policymakers, the studies did not lead to imme-
diate policy actions, especially at the national level. At the
turn of the 21st century, deteriorating insurance coverage2015) 1145–1152
coupled with a rapid increase in health care costs pushed
health care affordability to the top of the list of public’s
concerns [14].
However, Chinese leaders did not pay close attention to
the concern until the 2003 outbreak of severe acute respi-
ratory syndrome (SARS), which spread from China to 37
countries with 775 deaths reported world-wide [15,16].
The SARS also incurred huge economic losses [17]. Conse-
quently, it served as a wake-up call to Chinese leaders, who
recognized how underinvestment in the 1980s–1990s had
led the health care system to be unprepared for an emer-
gency [18]. Within several months of the SARS outbreak,
Chinese leaders decided on massive investment in the pub-
lic health system [12], including heavy subsidies for the
nation-wide implementation of NRCMS, which marked a
new era of health care ﬁnancing in China.
3.2. Strong public support for government intervention
in health care
Whereas the NRCMS implementation represented
China’s efforts to rebuild rural health insurance system,
there were no similar efforts in urban areas in the three
years after the SARS outbreak, resulting in dissatisfaction
among urban residents as they had difﬁculty paying med-
ical bills, or had to go without care [6]. Summarizing the
wide-spread discontent, a report by a high proﬁle think
tank that is afﬁliated with the State Council, China’s Cab-
inet, concluded that the health care reform before 2005
“was basically not successful” [19]. The report raised the
political stake to a higher level because of its immediate
popularity, and more importantly, its high proﬁle authors,
who  rarely publicly criticize government policies. There-
fore, it sparked a national debate about health care reform
in 2005.
One unique feature of the debate is strong public
support for government intervention in health care, mak-
ing China differ greatly from many countries [20,21].
Historically, both the famous “barefoot doctors” and
the cooperative medical scheme, the predecessor of
NRCMS, were keenly promoted by the governments in the
1960s–1970s [22]. Given the governments’ past success in
the health sector, it is not surprising that Chinese people
expected for renewed government role in the 2000s.
Another reason for the public support for government
intervention is the problems caused by privatization of
China’s health care system. While China’s governments
never formally published any privatization policies, they
reduced political and/or public funding support substan-
tially and forced doctors and health care facilities to
function much like for-proﬁt entities [23], resulting in the
phenomenon of de facto privatization as concluded by
researchers of the Chinese health care system [24]. For
example, the barefoot doctor system in rural China, which
was  once praised by WHO  as a successful example of pro-
viding health care services in developing countries [25,26],
declined rapidly after China’s economic reform started in
1978 because it no longer enjoyed political backing from
the central government and ﬁnancial support from local
governments and communities [27]. By the late 1980s,
barefoot doctors either became private practitioners or
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Table  1
Milestones in the evolution of China’s Health Care Financing Systems, 1949–2011.
Year(s) Key events
1949 Founding of the People’s Republic of China.
1951 Labor Insurance Scheme launched as an employment based health insurance program, targeting urban employers with 100 or
more employees.
1952 Government Insurance System launched as a public insurance program for government employees, their dependents, and
college students.
Late-1950s Cooperative Medical Scheme appearing in rural areas as a prepayment health plan organized at the village level, and ﬁnanced
jointly by village collective fund, upper level government subsidies, and premium paid by farmers.
Mid-1970s Cooperative Medical Scheme implemented in over 90% of villages, covering the vast majority of rural population.
1978 Economic reform initiated in rural areas with the agricultural collectives replaced by a new household-responsibility system.
1980s  Cooperative Medical Scheme collapsed.
1990s Labor Insurance System crippled by rising health costs and inefﬁciency of state-owned enterprises.
1998  Urban Employee Basic Medical Insurance launched in urban areas to replace both Labor Insurance Scheme and Government
Insurance Scheme.
2003 New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme implemented nation-wide with heavy government subsidies to rebuild the health
insurance system in rural areas.
2007 Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance launched with heavy government subsidies, targeting the unemployed, children, and
e than 9
S  and Tan
w
a
p
[
p
d
i
p
h
a
e
l
t
p
c
m
v
T
S
N
Sthe  disabled in urban areas.
2011 Universal coverage achieved in China with mor
ource: Compiled by the author using the published information from Gu
ere lost to other professions [22]. As another example,
lthough 95% of hospital are owned by the governments,
ublic funding is approximately 10% of hospital revenue
28]. To make a proﬁt, hospitals heavily relied on over-
rescribing drugs and diagnostic tests [29–31]. As a result,
rug spending was about half of China’s health expend-
tures, one of the highest shares in the world [32]. The
rivatization-induced overuse exacerbated the problem of
ealth care affordability [33].
The public’s concern with health care privatization is
lso due to a serious side-effect of China’s market-oriented
conomic reform, which caused millions of employees to
ose their jobs in the 1990s [34]. For the unemployed,
he terms of market-orientation and privatization inﬂict
ainful memories, including their losing health insurance
overage [34,35]. To correct the so-called “market failures”,
any researchers proposed for stronger government inter-
ention in the health sector [36]. As a counterargument,
able 2
ummary of China’s Three Public Insurance Programs, 2011.
UEBMI 
Target population Urban employees 
Enrollment rate (%) 92 
Number of enrollees (million) 252 
As  % of China’s 1.3 billion population 19 
Unit  of enrollment Individuals 
Risk-pooling unit City 
Premium per person per year (US$) 240 
Including government subsidy (US$) 0 
Beneﬁt coverage
Inpatient reimbursement rate (%) 68 
%  of counties or cities covering general
outpatient care
100 
%  of counties or cities covering
outpatient care for major and
chronic diseases
100 
Annual Reimbursement Ceiling Six-times average wage of
employee in the city
Overseeing government department MOHRSS 
ote: MOHRSS—Ministry of Human Resource and Social Security; NHFP—Nationa
ource: Adapted from Yip et al. (2012) [2] and Liang and Langenbrunner (2013) [5% of its population insured.
g (1995) [69], and Meng and Tang (2013) [4]
several researchers who noted that the limited market
mechanism ambiguously deﬁned by the governments has
distorted the health care system called for market-oriented
reform [21,37]. Because it was  not well received by gov-
ernment ofﬁcials [38], the counterargument was barely
discussed in the 2009 national health care reform plan [39].
3.3. Renewed political commitment from top leaders
In response to the public’s concerns and expectations,
Chinese leaders held a high proﬁle workshop in 2006,
at which President Hu Jintao committed to health care
reform by stressing that “The goal of reform is for everyone
to enjoy basic health care services” [40]. After releasing
the reform plan in 2009, the central government formally
reasserted its role in health care with unprecedented fund-
ing of 850 billion Chinese Yuan (about US$124 billion) for
ﬁve reform programs—expanding coverage, establishing
URBMI NCMS
Urban children, students,
unemployed, disabled
Rural residents
93 97
221 832
16 62
Individuals Households
City County
21 24
18 18
48 44
58 79
83 89
Six-times disposable income of
local residents
Six-times income of local
farmers
MOHRSS NHFP
l Health and Family Planning Commission.
1].
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a national essential drug list, improving primary care,
promoting equal access to public health services and
piloting public hospital reform programs [41,42].
There are two political reasons behind the renewed gov-
ernment support. First, contrary to a misunderstanding by
many observers [43], socialism remains China’s ofﬁcial ide-
ology, obligating its governments to improve its people’s
social well-being, including health care. The obligation may
not be fulﬁlled for some time (e.g., in the 1980s–1990s
when the governments focused on improving economic
indicators), but it cannot be completely ignored by the gov-
ernments as long as the state ideology remains unchanged
[43]. The historical success in the 1960s–1970s when China
was praised as an innovator in health care by the World
Health Organization [20,44], also reinforced the obligation
in the 2000s after the 30-year economic growth. Thus, in
2004, Chinese leaders announced NRCMS as an integral
part of their efforts to build the “new socialist country-
side”, an initiative to boost rural development [33]. The
fact that NRCMS, a health insurance program, carries the
socialist label illustrates the impact of state ideology on
contemporary Chinese society [40,45].
Second, the reinstated government role in health care is
consistent with China’s new development strategy, which
shifted from prioritizing economic development (so-called
GDP-ism) to an emphasis on building a harmonious soci-
ety to promote equity and improve social stability [41,43].
The new strategy reﬂected the leadership’s recognition that
economic growth does not necessarily lead to better health
care [43]. The recent government support for health care is
an important part of China’s efforts to balance social devel-
opment against economic growth.
3.4. Heavy government subsidies for health insurance
By 2011, government subsidies accounted for 75 and
85% of the premiums of NRCMS and URBMI respectively [2],
making these insurance programs very attractive invest-
ment options. The heavy subsidies are critical for coverage
expansion. For example, although Chinese governments
attempted to establish NRCMS in 1996, the NRCMS cov-
erage stayed at very low level until the subsidies were
announced in 2003 [46]. Within ﬁve years of the announce-
ment, the subsidies increased fourfold [21], and along with
the increased subsidies, the NRCMS enrollment rose to 800
million people [4].
3.5. Fiscal capacity backed by China’s economic power
With its ﬁscal capacity signiﬁcantly strengthened by the
double-digit economic growth in the past 30 years, Chinese
governments can afford to subsidize one billion people’s
health insurance. Despite the large scale investment, gov-
ernment health expenditures are still a small proportion of
total government expenditures (at 12.5% in 2011).
3.6. Engagement with local governments through
delegating ﬁnancial and political responsibilities
As a unique feature of China’s health care reform, the
central government required local governments not only2015) 1145–1152
to share the premium subsidies, but also to take political
responsibilities for expanding coverage. The State Coun-
cil’s Health Reform Ofﬁce signed “responsibility forms” –
effective political contracts – with provincial governments,
which further delegated tasks through contracts with
municipal or county governments. The contract required
that performance evaluation criteria for provincial and
local ofﬁcials include speciﬁc targets, such as 90% coverage
by NRCMS or URBMI. Not achieving these targets would
lead to poor scores for the performance evaluation of local
ofﬁcials, and have negative impacts on their future pro-
motion. With the delegated political responsibilities, local
ofﬁcials took considerable time and efforts to intensify out-
reach and enrollment activities.
3.7. Programmatic strategy of health care reform
Last but not least, China’s universal health insurance
coverage is attributed to its programmatic strategy of ﬁrst
achieving wide but shallow coverage before expanding
beneﬁts. According to the strategy, both NRCMS and URBMI
covered inpatient services only when they were launched.
Then, the two  programs started to cover outpatient services
in 2010. The governments also added to these programs
a list of priority diseases for enhanced beneﬁt coverage
[47]. After the reform’s ﬁrst stage of implementation in
2009–2011, the central government decided in 2012 on
further reforms to expand insurance beneﬁts, improve
coverage portability, and encourage complementary cov-
erage by private insurance. Such a programmatic strategy
through multi-stage implementations ensures China to
proceed steadily towards better access for its citizens.
4. Policy challenges and recommendations
While it is remarkable that China achieved univer-
sal health insurance coverage within a short period, the
country is still facing daunting challenges in health care
ﬁnancing, some of which are highlighted below.
4.1. Reducing ﬁnancial risk as an immediate task
The level of beneﬁt coverage is modest, as indicated in
Table 2. For example, the reimbursement rate of inpatient
care was relatively low in 2011, ranging from 44 to 68%
among the three public insurance programs, all of which
left the insured to bear a relatively large share of the bur-
den of inpatient care. The low beneﬁt level was  a direct
result of the modest premiums. Table 2 shows that the
annual premium was only US$24 and US$21 for NRCMS
and URBMI, respectively, both of which were too low to
offer any generous beneﬁt coverage. Not surprisingly, the
published evidence is equivocal about whether China’s cov-
erage expansion reduced patients’ ﬁnancial risk [48–53]. At
the national level, the proportion of out-of-pocket expendi-
tures to total national health expenditures was  signiﬁcantly
reduced from 60% in 2001 to 35% in 2011 (Fig. 1). However,
the proportion was  still higher than the average level of
33% among the group of upper-middle-income countries,
to which China belongs [1].
H. Yu / Health Policy 119 (2015) 1145–1152 1149
46 51
53 55 56
59 60 58 56 54 52 49 44 40 37 35 35
51 47
44 42 41
38 36 36 36 38 39 41 47 50 52 54 56
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
Priva te Health
Insurance  an d and
Extra-bu dgeta ry
Expen diture s
General governme nt
expenditure on  health
(GGHE) as  % of  TH E
Out of  po cket
expenditure as  % of
THE
F
S e).
t
s
t
r
p
C
t
4
p
g
e
s
i
f
l
F
f
W
t
(
o
i
e
g
l
o
e
e
s
h
P
f
g
The rising income also enables Chinese people to demandig. 1. Health expenditures by sources, 1995–2011.
ource: World Health Organization (see http://apps.who.int/nha/databas
China’s Minister of Health publicly acknowledged that
he ﬁnancial risk remained high in the context of univer-
al health insurance coverage [54]. To address the issue,
he government has raised the ceiling of public insurance
eimbursement with the goal of reducing out-of-pocket
ayment to 30% of total health expenditures by 2018.
hina’s efforts of ﬁnancial risk reduction can be more effec-
ive through reinsurance plans as discussed below.
.2. Equalizing beneﬁt coverage across insurance
rograms as a long-term goal
There is a wide gap in premiums across insurance pro-
rams with UEBI having premiums 10 times higher than
ither URBMI or NRCMS [2]. The gap in premiums leads to
ubstantial beneﬁt variations across insurance programs as
ndicated in Table 2. For example, the reimbursement rate
or inpatient care was only 44% for NRCMS in 2011, much
ower than the rate of 68% for UEBMI [52]. As illustrated in
ig. 2, the three major insurance programs differed greatly
rom each other in the coverage dimensions deﬁned by the
orld Health Organization, including breath (% of popula-
ion covered), depth (% of health costs covered) and scope
type of health services covered) [55]. Whereas the breath
f NRCMS is the largest, covering 62% of population in 2011,
t lagged behind other two insurance programs in terms of
ither depth or scope. Such disparities exist despite of the
overnments’ efforts to promote equitable health care [56].
The persistent disparities impose one of the most chal-
enging issues on China, which is still in the process
f rapid industrialization and urbanization. In particular,
liminating the rural–urban disparities in insurance ben-
ﬁt requires reform measures that go beyond the health
ector because the disparities are closely related to China’s
ousehold registration system maintained by Ministry of
ublic Security (MOPH), which separates rural residents
rom their urban counterparts with favorable social pro-
rams provided for the latter. MOPH planned to set up anew registration system by 2020 to eliminate the discrim-
ination again rural residents [57]. It might not be possible
to equalize the beneﬁt coverage across insurance programs
until the new registration system is established. The gov-
ernments may  want to gradually reduce the rural–urban
disparities in insurance beneﬁt before running the new
registration system.
4.3. Targeting speciﬁc populations, such as migrant
workers, as a priority
China had approximately 236 million migrant workers
in 2012 [58], who  are farmers seeking employment in cities.
Although they work and live in cities, the migrant workers
are still listed as rural population in the current household
registration system, and consequently they are enrolled
in their hometowns’ NRCMS. Such arrangements caused
two problems. (1) Most migrant workers cannot afford for
health care in cities since the NRCMS beneﬁt coverage is
lower than the URBMI or UEBMI. (2) Those workers who
seek health care in cities have to go back to their home-
towns to get reimbursement. Several cities have piloted
programs to allow migrant workers to enroll in URBMI or
UEBMI. Policymakers need to evaluate the pilot programs,
and to scale up those programs that are determined suc-
cessful.
4.4. Improving quality by tying provider payment to
performance
Given the unprecedented government investment in
health care, policymakers are keenly interested in knowing
whether the investment leads to higher value for patients.higher quality of care. To satisfy the demand, policymakers
need to push for quality improvement, especially by tying
provider payment by the three public insurance programs
to provider performance.
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sions acFig. 2. Variation in coverage dimen
4.5. Controlling costs through coordination between
insurance reform and other reforms
To address the public’s concern about the rapid growth
of health care costs [6], China’s policymakers have launched
several initiatives, such as the zero-proﬁt drug policy,
which aims to diminish proﬁt-making activities by elim-
inating mark-ups on drugs dispensed by hospitals. They
need to do more to control health care costs, especially
through coordination between the insurance reform and
other reform initiatives. For example, after China’s success
in insurance expansion, a large share of hospital revenues
came from user charges that the three public insurance pro-
grams reimbursed. The policymakers may  want to use the
large amounts of insurance reimbursement as a useful tool
for the ongoing hospital reform initiative to push hospitals
for improving quality of care, reducing waste and inefﬁ-
ciency, and controlling growth of health expenditures. One
option is to tie the insurance programs’ reimbursement to
hospital performance in improving quality and reducing
waste and inefﬁciency as discussed above. Another option
is to reform the insurance programs’ provider reimburse-
ment systems by replacing the fee-for-service payment
method with prospective methods, such as capitation
payment to primary care physicians, diagnosis-group-
adjusted payment to hospitals, and bundled payment. As
indicated by prior research [2], the policymakers may  want
to ensure that all the three insurance programs use the
same payment method and that providers do not compro-
mise quality of care to reduce costs under the new method.
4.6. Deﬁning clearly the role for private insurance
Private health insurance is relatively new to China,
covering 3.8% of national health spending in 2010 [59].
Demand for private insurance will increase substantially
as more Chinese people join the middle class and look
for better health care [60]. The central government, which
intends the three public insurance programs to cover only
basic health care, has decided to actively develop pri-
vate insurance market to meet the additional needs of
the publicly insured. However, the central government
has not yet deﬁned clearly the role for private insur-
ance to play in China’s health ﬁnancing system. Withoutross the three insurance programs.
a clearly deﬁned role, developing private insurance in
China might raise concerns about inequality given prior
study ﬁndings of negative impacts of supplemental pri-
vate insurance on health care outcomes in countries with
universal health insurance coverage [61,62]. China’s efforts
to develop private insurance can be strengthened by (1)
requiring the three public insurance programs to work
with private insurance companies on reinsurance plans
to mitigate the ﬁnancial risk of the publicly insured and
(2) investing in the country’s health information system
and training of health insurance experts, both of which
will enable private insurers to differentiate their prod-
ucts to meet the consumers’ diverse needs, rather than to
engage in the current price competition on similar portfo-
lios [63].
4.7. Conducting rigorous evaluations
Given its huge size and unbalanced socio-economic
development across regions, China needs to conduct rig-
orous evaluations of its insurance programs to determine
whether the programs meet its citizens’ diverse and grow-
ing needs of health care. Some experts suggested that China
should establish an “independent commission” for moni-
toring and evaluation [64]. Chinese ofﬁcials also promised
to support independent evaluations [65]. But they have not
made concrete efforts to facilitate such evaluations, e.g.,
by making many government-maintained datasets “more
open, transparent, and accessible to academics and the gen-
eral public” [64]. It remains to be seen whether China can
keep the promise of independent evaluations.
5. Conclusion and discussion
This paper identiﬁes seven factors for China’s univer-
sal health insurance coverage. Three of the factors seem
to be unique to China, including (1) the SARS outbreak, a
public health crisis that increased sharply political pres-
sure for coverage expansion, (2) the ﬁnancial and political
responsibilities delegated to local governments, which
mobilized local ofﬁcials to intensify outreach and enroll-
ment campaigns and (3) the programmatic strategy, which
led quickly to wide but shallow coverage.
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Other factors identiﬁed in this paper can also be found
n other countries’ experiences. As noted by prior research,
universal health coverage is everywhere accompanied by
 large role for government” [66]. In China’s experience,
he government role includes (1) the top leaders’ commit-
ent that was decisive for China’s embarking on a path
owards universal coverage, (2) the heavy government sub-
idies that facilitated insurance enrollment and (3) the
scal capacity that contributes to both China’s decision on
nd its implementation of coverage expansion.
Pursuing universal coverage is an ongoing “global health
ransition” [67], for which China’s experience offers sev-
ral lessons. First, China joined a group of countries (e.g.,
apan and Korea) that achieved universal health insurance
overage before becoming high-income countries [68]. The
igniﬁcance of China’s experience is that it reached uni-
ersal coverage during its process of industrialization and
rbanization, setting an encouraging example for other
ountries involved in similar processes.
Second, China’s programmatic strategy of providing
ide but shallow coverage before expanding beneﬁts offers
 practical lesson for other developing countries to target
arge rural populations with relatively low income and high
ninsurance rate.
Third, a crucial factor that underlies the large govern-
ent role in China’s universal coverage is the strong public
upport for government intervention in health care. With-
ut the strong public support, it could be difﬁcult to reach
niversal coverage.
Forth, the study found that China’s universal coverage
as driven by a combination of some factors unique to
hina and the factors commonly found in other countries’
overage expansion experiences. One lesson that other
eveloping countries can derive from this ﬁnding is that, to
nd their own path to universal coverage, they may  want
o adopt a combination strategy by taking advantage of
oth the unique characteristics of their own health care sys-
ems and some common factors that are shared with other
ountries’ coverage expansion experiences. Such a combi-
ation strategy can be helpful for them to design coverage
xpansion options that are socio-politically feasible in their
ational contexts.
Finally, in its new stage of health care reform, China
ow shares some common challenges with other countries
ith universal health insurance coverage, such as qual-
ty improvement and cost control. How China is going to
ddress those challenges will be of international interest.
e hope to report back in several years on China’s progress
n addressing the challenges.
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